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Missing in action: The EU–UK 
foreign, security and defence 
policy relationship after Brexit
Richard G. Whitman
Abstract
Brexit has transformed the EU–UK relationship into a foreign-policy challenge for both sides. 
The negotiations on the EU–UK future relationship have been a process in which both sides 
have been learning about the other as a third-party negotiator. The UK has taken a very different 
attitude to the Political Declaration, agreed alongside the Withdrawal Agreement (covering the 
terms of the UK’s departure from the EU), treating it as a guide rather than a roadmap for 
negotiations. And the UK has decided not to pursue negotiations with the EU on a future foreign, 
security and defence policy relationship. This is in a context in which the EU’s member states 
have committed to deepening security and defence cooperation. At present, and despite shared 
international challenges, a formal agreement on EU–UK foreign, security and defence policy looks 
set to be replaced by an approach of ‘muddling through’.
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Introduction
The UK’s departure from the EU on 31 January 2020 created a new foreign-policy chal-
lenge for both parties. Ending nearly half a century as an EU member state, the UK 
moved from being a participant shaping EU policy to being one of the subjects of its 
external action. For the UK, negotiating a future relationship with the EU became its 
most pressing foreign-policy challenge—with the outcome of the negotiations likely to 
have far-reaching economic, societal and economic effects.
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This profound shift in the EU–UK relationship to a third-party one was less remarked 
upon than might have been expected. And Brexit day was a more low-key affair than the 
Brexit drama of domestic political upheaval and extensive withdrawal negotiations 
might have warranted. This was primarily because immediate changes to the economic 
and social life of the UK were invisible as the country entered into the transition period 
provided for under the Withdrawal Agreement. The Withdrawal Agreement, agreed on 
17 October 2019, was negotiated under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union and 
provided the terms under which the UK exited the EU. The political drama of Brexit had 
also been largely muted before this by the election in December 2019 of a government 
led by Boris Johnson that had a significant parliamentary majority. This ensured the swift 
passage of the legislation ratifying the Withdrawal Agreement through the UK Parliament, 
ending domestic political deadlock and completing the first withdrawal of a member 
state from the EU under the terms of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union.
The subsequent negotiations on the future EU–UK relationship have provided a dif-
ferent kind of political drama from the earlier negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement. 
The major issue of controversy has been that the UK government has interpreted the 
Political Declaration on future EU–UK relations (agreed alongside the Withdrawal 
Agreement) in starkly different terms from the EU. The EU has treated the Political 
Declaration as a roadmap for structuring and organising the negotiations for a post-Brexit 
EU–UK relationship. The UK has interpreted the Declaration as non-binding guidance 
on how agreement might be reached. This significant difference of perspective has cre-
ated a difficult start in the relationship between the EU and its newest third-country 
partner. The negotiations have also been accompanied by public jousting between the 
lead negotiators, the UK’s David Frost and the EU’s Michel Barnier.
The negotiations have been overshadowed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both lead 
negotiators caught the virus and talks moved from face-to-face to online meetings for 
three rounds of negotiations. Beset by one of the most significant outbreaks of the virus, 
the UK’s negotiations with the EU have also been subordinated to the challenge pre-
sented by COVID-19. However, despite the major order challenge presented by the pan-
demic, the UK government took the decision not to extend the period for the negotiations 
beyond 31 December 2020 using the clauses of the Withdrawal Agreement that would 
have allowed for an extension of the transition period (Council of the European Union 
2019, art. 132; Moens 2020).
The effect of the pandemic, and the political dynamic created by the EU’s actions in 
response, has been to dramatically downgrade the future relationship with the UK in the 
order of the EU’s priorities. The UK is now a third-country problem to be managed (and 
a possible ‘no-deal’ relationship mitigated) rather than the post–June 2016 member state 
continuing to participate in EU decision-making whilst negotiating its departure. The 
dynamic has shifted from EU27+1 to a new configuration of the EU27 interacting with 
the UK through the Joint Committee (established to manage the joint commitments made 
under the Withdrawal Agreement) and simultaneously as a third party seeking to negoti-
ate a future relationship.
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No negotiations: the foreign, security and defence policy 
relationship
A striking characteristic of the current EU–UK relationship is that it is focused almost 
entirely on the current and future trading relationship. The nature of the trade relation-
ship, of course, has broader foreign and security policy implications, as demonstrated 
most clearly with respect to Northern Ireland. However, this has not translated into an 
impetus for an understanding of the future relationship beyond trade and trade-related 
issues—and it is notable that there are no ongoing negotiations on the future EU–UK 
foreign, security and defence policy relationship.
Since Brexit in January 2020, the UK has been operating under the terms of the 
Withdrawal Agreement. This contained provisions to cover the UK’s relationship with 
the EU’s security and defence policy during the transition period (Council of the 
European Union 2019, art. 129). These commit the UK to following EU foreign policy 
and security positions but without participating in the institutions that determine that 
policy, notably the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee, the 
EU Military Committee, and the attendant committees and working groups that define 
and implement the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.
The UK has ceased to be directly involved in decisions on the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) but continues to contribute financing, staff and other assets to 
CSDP missions which are underway (Council of the European Union 2019, art. 156), 
most notably, forces for Operation Althea. During the pre-Brexit negotiation of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, the UK exited its existing EU security and defence commitments 
by withdrawing from the EU’s roster of Battlegroups, relinquishing its provision of an 
Operational Headquarters for the Atlanta CSDP naval mission and ceasing to provide 
operational commanders for CSDP missions. UK participation in any CSDP operations 
launched before the end of the year will be on the basis of third-country arrangements 
rather than the arrangements for the EU27. Consequently, until the end of 2020 the UK is 
formally committed to playing this shadow role in the EU’s foreign, security and defence 
policy while being absent from decision-making, following EU positions but without a 
substantive role in their implementation.
The original intention was that these measures would be a stop-gap, with new arrange-
ments for EU–UK foreign, security and defence policy cooperation coming into force 
before the end of the transition period (Council of the European Union 2019, art. 127.2). 
The Political Declaration, outlining the ambitions for the post-Brexit EU–UK relation-
ship, contained detailed proposals on the terms of the future relationship in the fields of 
foreign, security and defence policy (UK, HM Government 2019, Part III, III). The 
Political Declaration specified cooperation in areas such as sanctions, the defence indus-
try and research, and consular cooperation in third countries. It also envisaged the UK 
being invited to EU foreign minister meetings and raised the prospect of the UK partici-
pating in EU military operations.
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As the Political Declaration was a jointly agreed document it has been something of a 
surprise for the EU that the UK has not wished to negotiate on future foreign, security 
and defence policy cooperation (Whitman 2020). And the UK made no mention of coop-
eration in these areas when it published its own draft texts for future EU–UK agreements 
in May 2020 (UK, HM Government 2020).
The UK has taken the decision to negotiate with the EU exclusively on the future trad-
ing relationship, to the exclusion of other non-trade and border-related issues. Unlike a 
failure to reach agreement on the terms of the framework for EU–UK trade, the UK’s 
withdrawal from foreign, security and defence policymaking during the transition period 
means that the immediate costs of Brexit have already been incurred. Further, it can be 
argued that the foreign, security and defence policy field was one of the first areas of 
policy to be impacted by Brexit.
A foreign and defence policy future without the UK
The coincidence of the June 2016 Brexit vote and the publication of the EU’s Global 
Strategy symbiotically provided the basis for a greater level of ambition for the EU, 
including a push for ‘strategic autonomy’ and moves towards the creation of an EU 
defence union.
The vote to leave the EU had the consequence of eliminating the UK’s capacity to 
influence debate on the future of EU security and defence. And it facilitated an opportu-
nity for the EU’s foreign policy chief, High Representative Federica Mogherini (until 
November 2018), to pursue a new agenda with considerable vigour. Security and defence 
have become a priority area for further EU integration. The current European Commission, 
French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and a range of 
other member state politicians have signalled their ambitions for deeper security and 
defence integration as a component of an enhanced European global role. The Global 
Strategy has set a roadmap for developing EU security and defence ambitions and capa-
bilities, with considerable policy development undertaken over the last three and a half 
years. Consequently, EU–UK negotiations on a future security and defence policy rela-
tionship take place in a context in which EU policy is developing in a direction that was 
resisted by the UK as a member state and over which it will have minimal influence to 
set the agenda.
Further, a key aspect of these developments is that they are being pursued without 
substantive consideration of the role and participation of third countries. This means that 
the UK’s departure from the EU, despite its significant security and defence capabilities, 
has not been used by the member states as a basis to consider how third countries might 
facilitate the EU’s ambitions for capabilities development. Rather, there has been con-
cern not to create a precedent for relationships with third countries by conceding a role 
for the UK that is more ambitious than those already in existence with other third coun-
tries. Furthermore, there is also a consideration that the UK should not be allowed to use 
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its contribution to European security and defence as leverage for advantage in the trade-
related aspects of the negotiations on the future EU–UK relationship.
The Withdrawal Agreement negotiations also demonstrated that the UK’s and the 
EU’s negotiating stances limited the scope for a deep and comprehensive security part-
nership. The EU’s position, pursued by Mr Barnier and the Article 50 task force, that the 
UK should not be granted privileges or access to EU foreign, security and defence poli-
cymaking that exceeded those already granted to third countries, limited the scope of the 
relationship. One of the consequences of this position was demonstrated in the plan to 
curtail access to the Galileo global satellite-based navigation programme, of which the 
UK had been a committed participant. The EU’s focus on preserving the integrity of the 
single market trumped security and defence cooperation. The Galileo issue had a chas-
tening impact on those in the UK advocating a close post-Brexit EU–UK security and 
defence relationship, and resulted in the UK government committing to build its own 
satellite system.
However, unlike other aspects of the EU–UK negotiations (which are about the con-
sequences of the degree of divergence from EU rules and norms), European security and 
defence is situated within a complicated landscape of competing and overlapping organi-
sations, bilateral agreements and commitments, and a major role is played by a non-
European country, the US. The EU is not the exclusive venue for European security and 
defence policy development, nor does it, or its member states, provide all the capabilities 
necessary for securing and defending Europe. European security and defence is an area 
in which the UK has both a role and national capabilities that give it a salience that is 
different from other areas in the EU–UK negotiations.
With all of these challenges in play, determining the future EU–UK security and 
defence policy relationship will be a complicated undertaking. This is especially true as 
seeking a new identity for Britain in international relations has been a core component of 
the argument for Brexit. The much-maligned idea of ‘Global Britain’, used by UK gov-
ernments since 2016 to signify a new post-Brexit role for the UK, has signalled the ambi-
tion and intent of the UK to seek greater autonomy for its international diplomacy and 
especially its foreign economic policy. The implication is that there will be a divergence 
(although with uncertainty as to what degree and in what areas) from the EU’s norms, 
practices and ambitions in the security and defence field.
The future: muddling through?
At the time of writing, the EU–UK relationship on foreign, security and defence policy 
looks likely to move from the arrangements established for the transition period to a situ-
ation in which there are no formally established arrangements for cooperation. This, of 
course, does not mean the lack of a foreign, security and defence policy relationship 
between the UK and the EU’s member states. The UK’s European bilateral, mini-lateral 
and multilateral relationships will all continue, but with the unsettled EU–UK relation-
ship circumscribing the scope of future cooperation.
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The EU–UK foreign, security and defence policy relationship has been transformed in a 
relatively short space of time. The UK has moved from its role as a member state central to 
EU decision-making and implementation, through a brief period of shadowing EU foreign 
and security policy during the transition, to the current state of ambiguity as to whether the 
relationship will evolve to one of a rebooted alliance or one between frenemies.
At present there are no active or planned negotiations on the future EU–UK foreign, 
security and defence policy relationship. Consequently, if an EU–UK future relationship 
treaty is agreed before the end of 2020, the principles and modalities of foreign, security 
and defence policy cooperation will be absent. Whether reaching agreement on the EU–
UK future trading relationship will then pave the way for a willingness on the part of the 
UK government to seek to broaden cooperation is uncertain. At the present time the odds 
look much more likely that the UK will pursue an approach of ‘muddling through’. This 
would be to avoid an overarching framework for EU–UK foreign, security and defence 
policy cooperation, in line with the UK preference for seeking ad hoc arrangements for 
cooperation where judged to be appropriate and necessary.
Such an approach by the UK would be in keeping with the behaviour exhibited during 
the transition period. The UK has adopted a three-track approach. First, it has demonstrated 
its capacity to caucus with other groupings to highlight new post-Brexit possibilities (such 
as coordination with Five Eyes partners on policy regarding Hong Kong) (BBC News 
2020). Second, there has been the low-key prioritisation of other foreign-policy coopera-
tion formats in Europe (most particularly E3 cooperation with France and Germany) 
(Billon-Galland and Whitman 2020). And third, it has studiously avoided cheerleading for 
EU foreign-policy positions where the UK is seeking a differently calibrated relationship 
(most notably on the current Turkey policy in the Eastern Mediterranean) (Meral 2020).
The language employed by the May government regarding the EU–UK security part-
nership has disappeared under the Johnson administration (UK, HM Government 2017). 
Advocacy of a far-reaching EU–UK formalised strategic alliance on foreign and security 
policy is currently absent in Westminster and Whitehall. The current Integrated Review 
of Security, Defence and Development Policy, defining the government’s vision for the 
UK’s role in the world over the next decade, will likely make no substantive reference to 
the EU. The EU’s recent difficulties in agreeing sanctions on Belarus and the apparently 
diminishing momentum in Brussels for an EU defence union will allow the UK govern-
ment to reassure itself that the UK is not being excluded from a rapidly coalescing EU 
foreign and security policy to which it might consider it needs to align itself.
With a security partnership not in prospect, and with a UK government that has delib-
erately sought to loosen the EU–UK trading relationship (by leaving the EU customs 
union and seeking to allow itself the scope for regulatory divergence) to allow for greater 
autonomy in trade policy and managing its economy, the UK is set on a different trajec-
tory to the EU and its member states. In the medium to long term the extent to which 
divergences in approaches towards political economy will impinge on foreign and secu-
rity policy will be conditional on the extent to which trade policy impacts the 
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UK’s foreign policy writ large. In the short term the outcome of the 2020 US presidential 
election will be of greater importance. If President Donald J. Trump is re-elected—and if 
he then goes on to pursue a second-term agenda that further undermines multilateralism, 
weakens the US security commitment to Europe through NATO, and pursues a confron-
tational approach towards China and the EU—this will place the UK’s foreign and secu-
rity policy under considerable strain. Facing a choice between alignment with a capricious 
White House actively undermining international multilateralism and rendering the trans-
atlantic security relationship irrelevant, the UK will face an existential crisis in its diplo-
macy and security and defence policies. The election of Joe Biden would confront the 
UK with the different challenge of needing to work hard to persuade the new administra-
tion (not withstanding close intelligence, security and defence links) that Brexit has not 
greatly diminished Britain’s European and global influence.
The outcome of the US presidential election will, therefore, impinge on the EU–UK 
relationship and may encourage a reset in cross-channel dialogue. This could thereby 
create a new atmosphere that is more encouraging of discussions on a more formal for-
eign, security and defence policy relationship. However, such a change could be can-
celled out by the domestic political constraints faced by the current UK government. The 
preoccupations of managing the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
together with the adjustment of the UK economy to a different trading relationship with 
the EU, will be accompanied by more demands in managing the Union of the UK. There 
will likely be increasing agitation for a second Scottish independence referendum fol-
lowing Scottish Parliament elections in May 2021 and additional complexity in the poli-
tics of a post-Brexit Northern Ireland.
The politics of the Conservative Party is also likely to inhibit an evolution of the 
EU–UK relationship. The degree of antipathy towards the EU within the Conservative 
Party has been heightened during the Brexit negotiations. A broadening and deepening of 
cooperation beyond trade policy will face significant opposition. Security and defence 
cooperation with the EU is a taboo for many Conservative Party Members of Parliament 
and also for elements in the grass roots of the party.
Reaching the end of December 2020 with no agreement in place between the EU 
and the UK will push a settled foreign, security and defence policy relationship even 
further into the future. Failure to reach agreement on a future trading relationship will 
become the major policy preoccupation of both sides. Managing the consequences of 
a trading relationship that reverts to trading on WTO terms, whether as the prelude to 
further negotiations or as the ongoing basis for the trading relationship, will push dis-
cussion on other key policy issues such as foreign and security cooperation into the 
background.
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